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Abstract—Website fingerprinting attacks[10] enable an adver-
sary to infer which website a victim is visiting, even if the victim
uses an encrypting proxy, such as Tor[19]. Previous work has
shown that all proposed defenses against website fingerprinting
attacks are ineffective[5], [3]. This paper advances the study
of website fingerprinting attacks and defenses in two ways.
First, we develop bounds on the trade-off between security and
bandwidth overhead that any fingerprinting defense scheme can
achieve. This enables us to compare schemes with different
security/overhead trade-offs by comparing how close they are
to the lower bound. We then refine, implement, and evaluate
the Congestion-Sensitive BuFLO scheme outlined by Cai, et
al. [3]. CS-BuFLO, which is based on the provably-secure BuFLO
defense proposed by Dyer, et al.[5], was not fully-specified by
Cai, et al, but has nonetheless attracted the attention of the
Tor developers [16], [17]. Our experiments find that Congestion-
Sensitive BuFLO has high overhead (around 2.3-2.8x) but can
get 6× closer to the bandwidth/security trade-off lower bound
than Tor or plain SSH.
I. INTRODUCTION
Website fingerprinting attacks have emerged as a serious
threat against web browsing privacy mechanisms, such as
SSL, Tor, and encrypting tunnels. These privacy mechanisms
encrypt the content transferred between the web server and
client, but they do not effectively hide the size, timing, and
direction of packets. A website fingerprinting attack uses these
features to infer the web page being loaded by a client.
Researchers have engaged in a war of escalation in de-
veloping website fingerprinting attacks and defenses, with
two recent papers demonstrating that all previously-proposed
defenses provide little security[5], [3]. At the 2012 Oakland
conference, Dyer, et al. showed that an attacker could infer,
with a success rate over 80%, which of 128 pages a victim
was visiting, even if the victim used network-level counter-
measures. They also performed a simulation-based evaluation
of a hypothetical defense, which they call BuFLO, and found
that it required over 400% bandwidth overhead in order to
reduce the success rate of the best attack to 5%, which is
still well-above the ideal 0.7% success rate from random
guessing. At CCS 2012, Cai et al. proposed the DLSVM
fingerprinting attack and demonstrated that it could achieve a
greater than 75% success rate against numerous defenses[3],
including application-level defenses, such as HTTPOS[13] and
randomized pipelining[15]. As a result, it is not currently
known whether there exists any efficient and secure defense
against website fingerprinting attacks.
Cai, et al. also proposed Congestion-Sensitive BuFLO,
which extended Dyer’s BuFLO scheme to include congestion
sensitivity and some rate adaptation, but they left many details
unspecified and did not implement or evaluate their scheme.
Despite the lack of data on CS-BuFLO, the Tor project has
indicated interest in incorporating CS-BuFLO into the Tor
browser [17], [16].
In order to get a better understanding of the performance
and security of the CS-BuFLO protocol, this paper presents a
complete specification of CS-BuFLO, describes an SSH-based
implementation, and evaluates its bandwidth overhead, latency
overhead, and security against the current best-known attacks.
Cai’s description of the CS-BuFLO protocol outlines solu-
tions to several performance and practicality problems in the
original BuFLO protocol – CS-BuFLO is TCP-friendly, it pads
streams in a uniform way, and it uses information collected
offline to tune BuFLO’s parameters to the website being
loaded. We propose two further improvements: we modify
CS-BuFLO to adapt its transmission rate dynamically, and we
improve its stream padding to use less bandwidth while hiding
more information about the website being loaded. Dynamic
rate adaptation makes CS-BuFLO much more practical to
deploy, since it does not require an infrastructure for perform-
ing offline collection of statistics about websites, but poses a
challenge: adapting too quickly to the website’s transmission
rate can reveal information about which website the victim is
visiting. CS-BuFLO balances these performance and security
constraints by limiting the rate and precision of adaptation.
We have implemented CS-BuFLO in a custom version
of OpenSSH. Our implementation also includes a Firefox
browser plugin that informs the SSH client when the browser
has finished loading a web page. The CS-BuFLO implemen-
tation uses this information to reduce the amount of padding
performed after the page load has completed.
We evaluate CS-BuFLO, and compare it to Tor, on the
Alexa top 200 websites in the closed-world setting. The Alexa
top 200 websites represent approximately 91% of page loads
on the internet [1], so these results reflect the security users
will obtain when using these schemes in the real world.
Furthermore, prior work on website fingerprinting attacks has
found that an attackers success rate only goes down as the
number of websites increases, so our results give a high-
confidence upper bounds on the success rate these attacks may
achieve in larger settings.
In our experiments, CS-BuFLO uses 2.8 times as much
bandwidth as SSH (i.e. no defense) and the best known attack
had only a 20% success rate at inferring which of 200 websites
a victim was visiting. This is a substantial improvement over
previously-proposed schemes – the same attack had a success
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2Defense n Method Source Panchenko VNG++ DLSVM BW Ratio Latency Ratio
CS-BuFLO (CTSP) 200 Empirical this paper 18.0 13.0 20.6 2.796 3.271
CS-BuFLO (CPSP) 200 Empirical this paper 24.2 16.5 34.3 2.289 2.708
CS-BuFLO (CTSP) 120 Empirical this paper 23.4 20.9 28.9 2.799 3.444
CS-BuFLO (CPSP) 120 Empirical this paper 30.6 22.5 40.5 2.300 2.733
BuFLO (τ = 0, ρ = 40, d = 1000) 128 Simulation [5] 27.3 22.0 N/A 1.935 N/A
BuFLO (τ = 0, ρ = 40, d = 1500) 128 Simulation [5] 23.3 18.3 N/A 2.200 N/A
BuFLO (τ = 0, ρ = 20, d = 1000) 128 Simulation [5] 20.9 15.6 N/A 2.405 N/A
BuFLO (τ = 0, ρ = 20, d = 1500) 128 Simulation [5] 24.1 18.4 N/A 3.013 N/A
BuFLO (τ = 105, ρ = 40, d = 1000) 128 Simulation [5] 14.1 12.5 N/A 2.292 N/A
BuFLO (τ = 105, ρ = 40, d = 1500) 128 Simulation [5] 9.4 8.2 N/A 2.975 N/A
BuFLO (τ = 105, ρ = 20, d = 1000) 128 Simulation [5] 7.3 5.9 N/A 4.645 N/A
BuFLO (τ = 105, ρ = 20, d = 1500) 128 Simulation [5] 5.1 4.1 N/A 5.188 N/A
HTTPOS 100 Empirical [3] 57.4 N/A 75.8 1.361 N/A
Tor+rand. pipe. 100 Empirical [3] 62.8 N/A 87.3 1.745 N/A
Tor 100 Empirical [3] 65.4 N/A 83.7 N/A N/A
Tor 120 Empirical this paper 56.3 36.8 77.4 1.247 4.583 a
Tor 200 Empirical this paper 50.1 31.8 75.1 1.244 4.919
Tor 775 Empirical [14] 54.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tor 800 Empirical [3] 40.1 N/A 50.6 N/A N/A
SSH 120 Empirical this paper 86.5 75.0 80.7 1.128 1
SSH 200 Empirical this paper 84.4 72.9 79.4 1.111 1
aNote that the high latency of TOR is largely due to its onion routing protocols – a cost that other defenses do not incur.
TABLE I
MAIN EVALUATION RESULTS FOR CS-BUFLO, AND COMPARISON TO RESULTS ON OTHER SCHEMES REPORTED IN OTHER PAPERS.
rate over 75% against Tor and SSH under the same conditions.
Table I compares our results with results reported in other
papers. These comparisons must be done carefully, since the
experiments used different numbers of websites and method-
ologies. Nonetheless, the following conclusions are clear from
the data:
• CS-BuFLO hides more information than Tor, SSH,
HTTPOS, and Tor with randomized pipelining, albeit
with higher cost. For example, the DLSVM attack has a
lower success rate against CS-BuFLO in a closed-world
experiment with 100 websites than it has against Tor with
800 websites.
• Overall, CS-BuFLO achieves approximately the same
bandwidth/security trade-off in our empirical analysis
as BuFLO achieved in Dyer’s simulated evaluation. For
example, CS-BuFLO in CTSP mode had a bandwidth
ratio of 2.8 and Panchenko’s attack had a success rate of
23.4% on 120 websites. BuFLO with τ = 0, ρ = 40, and
d = 1500 had almost identical security, but a bandwidth
ratio of 2.2. Although CS-BuFLO optimizes many aspects
of the BuFLO protocol, an empirical evaluation presents
issues that do not arise in a simulation, such as dropped
packets, retransmissions, and application-level timing de-
pendencies.
In addition to the empirical work on CS-BuFLO, this paper
provides an analytical study of the problem of defending
against website fingerprinting attacks. We show that construct-
ing an optimally-efficient defense scheme for a given set
of websites is an NP-hard problem. We then develop lower
bounds on the best possible trade-off between security and
overhead that any website fingerprinting defense can achieve.
Specifically, given a set of websites and a desired security
level, we can compute a lower bound on the bandwidth
overhead that any defense scheme with that security level can
incur on those websites. This enables us to compare defenses
that offer different security/bandwidth trade-offs by comparing
how close they are to the lower bound.
The paper concludes by using the lower bounds to compare
defenses that offer different bandwidth/security trade-offs. We
find that Congestion-Sensitive BuFLO gets over 6× closer
to the bandwidth/security trade-off lower bound than Tor or
plain SSH. Dyer’s reported experiments with BuFLO showed
somewhat better trade-off performance, but those results were
based on simulations and are not directly comparable. Despite
the improvement of CS-BuFLO over Tor and SSH, there is still
a large gap between the lower bounds and the best defenses.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• Section IV provides the first analytical results on the
website fingerprinting defense problem, showing that
constructing an optimal defense is NP-hard and discover-
ing lower bounds on the best possible trade-off between
bandwidth and security.
• Section V gives a complete specification of the CS-
BuFLO protocol, describing optimizations to make the
protocol congestion sensitive, rate adaptive, and efficient
at hiding macroscopic website features, such as total size
and the size of the last object.
• Section VI describes our prototype implementation in
SSH, which also includes a Firefox plugin to notify the
proxy when the browser finishes loading a web page.
• Section VII presents empirical evaluation results for CS-
BuFLO, Tor, and SSH, and shows that CS-BuFLO pro-
vides better security, albeit at higher bandwidth costs. We
also show that CS-BuFLO is closer to the lower bound
on the security/bandwidth trade-off than Tor and SSH.
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Fig. 1. Website fingerprinting attack threat model.
II. RELATED WORK
Defenses: Network-level website fingerprinting defenses
pad packets, split packets into multiple packets, or insert
dummy packets. Dyer, et al., list numerous approaches to
padding individual packets, including pad-to-MTU, pad-to-
power-of-two, random padding, etc.[5]. They showed that none
of the padding schemes was effective against the attacks they
evaluated. Wright, et al., proposed traffic morphing, in which
packets are padded and/or fragmented so that they conform to
a specified target distribution[21]. Dyer, et al., defeated this
defense, as well[5]. Lu, et al., extended traffic morphing to
operate on n-grams of packet sizes, i.e. their scheme pads
and fragments packets so that n-grams of packet sizes match
a target distribution[12]. Dyer, et al. also proposed BuFLO,
which pads or fragments all packets to a fixed size, sends
packets at fixed intervals, injecting dummy packets when
necessary, and always transmits for at least a fixed amount of
time[5]. They found that they could reduce their best attack’s
success rate to 5% (when guessing from 128 websites), at a
bandwidth overhead of 400%. Fu, et al., found in early work
that changes in CPU load can cause slight variations in the
time between packets in schemes that attempt to send packets
at fixed intervals, and recommended randomized inter-packet
intervals instead[6].
Application-level defenses alter the sequence of HTTP
requests and responses to further obfuscate the user’s activity.
For example, HTTPOS uses HTTP pipelining, HTTP Range
requests, dummy requests, extraneous HTTP headers, multiple
TCP connections, and munges TCP window sizes and max-
imum segment size (MSS) fields[13]. Tor has also released
an experimental version of Firefox that randomizes the order
in which embedded objects are requested, and the level of
pipelining used by the browser during the requests[15]. Both
schemes were defeated by Cai, et al[3].
Attacks: Researchers have proposed numerous attacks on
basic encrypting tunnels, such as HTTPS, link-level encryp-
tion, VPNs, and IPSec[2], [4], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [18],
[22], [23], [5]. These attacks focus primarily on packet sizes,
which carry a lot of information when no padding scheme
is in use. Herrmann, et al., developed an attack based on
packet sizes that worked well on simple encrypting tunnels[9],
but performed quite poorly against Tor, which transmits data
in 512-byte cells. Panchenko, et al., designed an attack that
used packet sizes, along with some ad hoc features designed
to capture higher-level information about the HTTP protocol,
and achieved good success against Tor[14]. Dyer, et al. per-
formed a comprehensive evaluation of attacks and defenses,
and developed their own attack, called VNG++, that achieved
good success against many network-level defenses[5]. Cai, et
al., proposed an attack, based on string edit distance, that
performs well against a wide variety of defenses, included
application-level defenses, such as HTTPOS and Tor’s ran-
domized pipelining[3]. Wang, et al. improved this attack’s
performance against Tor by incorporating information about
the structure of the Tor protocol [20]. Danezis, Yu, et al., and
Cai, et al., all proposed to use HMMs to extend web page
fingerprinting attacks to web site fingerprinting attacks[4],
[22], [3].
III. WEBSITE FINGERPRINTING ATTACKS
In a website fingerprinting attack, an adversary is able to
monitor the communications between a victim’s computer and
a private web browsing proxy, as shown in Figure 1. The
private browsing proxy may be an SSH proxy, VPN server,
Tor, or other privacy service. The traffic between the user and
proxy is encrypted, so the attacker can only see the timing,
direction, and size of packets exchanged between the user and
the proxy. Based on this information, the attacker attempts to
infer the website(s) that the user is visiting via the proxy. The
attacker can prepare for the attack by collecting information
about websites in advance. For example, he can visit websites
using the same privacy service as the victim, collecting a set
of website “fingerprints”, which he later uses to recognize the
victim’s site.
Website fingerprinting attacks are an important class of
attacks on private browsing systems. For example, Tor states
that it “prevents anyone from learning your location or brows-
ing habits.”[19] Successful fingerprinting attacks undermine
this security goal. Fingerprinting attacks are also a natural
fit for governments that monitor their citizens’ web browsing
habits. The government may choose not to (or be unable
to) block the privacy service, but nonetheless wish to infer
citizens’ activities when using the service. Since it can monitor
international network connections, the government is in a good
position to mount website fingerprinting attacks.
Researchers have proposed two scenarios for evaluating
website fingerprinting attacks and defenses: closed-world mod-
els and open-world models. A closed-world model consists
4of a finite number, n, of web pages. Typical values of n
used in past work range from 100 to 800 [5], [3], [14]. The
attacker can collect traces and train his attack on the websites
in the world. The victim then selects one website uniformly at
random, loads it using some defense mechanism, such as Tor
or SSH, and the attacker attempts to guess which website the
victim loaded. The key performance metric is the attacker’s
average success rate.
In an open-world model, there is a population of victims,
each of which may visit any website in the real world, and
may select the website using a probability distribution of their
choice. The attacker does not know any individual victim’s
distribution over websites, but has aggregate statistics about
website popularity. The attacker’s goal is to infer which of the
victims are visiting a particular “website of interest”, i.e. an
illegal or censored site. In this case, the primary evaluation
criteria are false positives and false negatives.
Perry has critiqued the closed-world model for its artifi-
ciality [16]. However, the two models are connected: Cai, et
al., showed how to bootstrap a closed-world attack into an
open-world attack, such that better closed-world performance
yields better open-world performance [3]. Thus, although
experiments in the closed-world cannot tell us whether an
attack or defense will be successful in the real world, we can
use closed-world experiments to compare different attacks and
defenses.
IV. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
In this section we focus on understanding the relationship
between bandwidth overhead and security guarantees. We first
introduce definitions of security and overhead for fingerprint-
ing defenses. We observe that the overhead required depends
on the set of web sites to be protected – a set of similar web-
sites can be protected with little overhead, a set of dissimilar
websites requires more overhead. We then consider an offline
version of the website fingerprinting defense problem, i.e. the
defense system knows, in advance, the set of websites that
the user may visit and the packet traces that each website
may generate. We show that finding a defense system with
optimal overhead in this setting is NP-hard. We then develop
an efficient dynamic program to compute a lower bound on
the bandwidth overhead of any fingerprinting defense scheme
in the closed-world setting. We will use this algorithm to
compute lower bounds on overhead for the websites used in
our evaluation (see Section VII).
A. Definitions
In a website fingerprinting attack, the defender selects a
website, w, and uses the defense mechanism to load the
website, producing a packet trace, t, that is observed by the
attacker. The attacker then attempts to guess w.
Let W be a random variable representing the URL of the
website selected by the defender. The probability distribution
of W reflects the probability that the defender visits each
website. For each website, w, let TDw and Tw be the random
variables representing the packet trace generated by loading
w with and without defense system D, respectively. Packet
traces include the time, direction, and content of each packet.
Since cryptographic attacks are out of scope for this paper,
we assume any encryption functions used by the defense
scheme are information-theoretically secure. The probability
distribution of TDw captures variations in network conditions,
changes in dynamically-generated web pages, randomness
in the browser, and randomness in the defense system. We
assume the attacker knows the distribution of W and TDw for
every w, so the optimal attacker, A, upon observing trace t,
always outputs
A(t) = argmax
w
Pr[W = w] Pr
[
TDw = t
]
If more than one w attains the maximum, then the attacker
chooses randomly among them.
Some privacy applications require good worst-case perfor-
mance, and some only require good average-case performance.
This leads to two security definitions for website fingerprinting
defenses:
Definition 1. Defense D is non-uniformly -secure if
Pr
[
A(TDW ) =W
] ≤ . Defense D is uniformly -secure if
maxw Pr
[
A(TDw ) = w
] ≤ .
These are information-theoretic security definitions – A
is the optimal attacker described above. The first definition
says that A’s average success rate is less than , but it does
not require that every website be difficult to recognize. The
second definition requires all websites to be at least  difficult
to recognize. All previous papers on website fingerprinting
attacks and defenses have reported average attack success rates
in the closed-world model, i.e. they have reported non-uniform
security measurements. We will do the same, although we
provide some comparison with non-uniform security bounds
in Section VII.
To define the bandwidth overhead of a defense system, let
B(t) be the total number of bytes transmitted in trace t. We
define the bandwidth ratio of defense D as
BWRatioD(W ) =
E
[
B
(
TDW
)]
E [B (TW )]
This definition captures the overall ratio of bandwidth between
a user using defense D for an extended period of time and a
user visiting the same websites with no defense.
B. Lower Bounds for Bandwidth
In this section we derive an algorithm to compute, given
websites w1, . . . , wn, a lower bound for the bandwidth that
any deterministic -secure fingerprinting defense can use in a
closed-world experiment using w1, . . . , wn. In a closed-world
experiment, each website occurs with equal probability, i.e.
Pr[W = wi] =
1
n for all i.
To compute a lower bound on bandwidth, we consider an
adversary that looks only at the amount of data transferred by
the defense, i.e. an attacker AS that always guesses
AS(t) = argmax
w
Pr
[
B(TDw ) = B(t)
]
Any defense that is -secure against an arbitrary attacker must
also be at least -secure against AS . Thus, if we can derive
5a lower bound on defenses that are -secure against AS , that
lower bound will apply to any -secure defense.
We make a few simplifying assumptions in order to obtain
an efficient algorithm for computing lower bounds. First, we
assume that each website has a unique fixed size, si. In our
closed world experiments, we found that, for just over half the
web pages in our dataset, their size had a normalized standard
deviation of less than 0.11 across 20 loads, so we do not
believe this assumption will significantly impact the results of
our analysis. Second, we assume the defense scheme induces a
deterministic mapping, bi = f(si), from the website’s original
size to the size of the trace observed by the attacker. Finally,
we assume that the defense mechanism does not compress or
truncate the website, i.e. that bi ≥ si for all i.
Suppose f is the function induced by such a defense.
Let F = {f(s1), . . . , f(sn)}. For any given b ∈ F , let
nb = |f−1(b)|, i.e. the number of websites that cause the
defense mechanism to transmit b bytes. The probability that
the attacker observes b during a closed world experiment is
simply nb/n, and the probability that the attacker guesses the
correct website based on observation b is 1/nb. Thus the non-
uniform security of the defense scheme is∑
b∈F
nb
n
1
nb
=
|F |
n
and the uniform security is maxb∈F 1/nb. The bandwidth
requirements of the defense is proportional to∑
b∈F
bnb.
Let Sb = f−1(b). Since the defense does not compress or
truncate sites, we must have b ≥ maxs∈Sb s. For the purposes
of computing lower bounds on the bandwidth, we may as well
assume that b = maxs∈Sb s. Thus the function f is equivalent
to a partition of the set {s1, . . . , sn}.
These observations imply that the optimal f must be mono-
tonic.
Theorem 1. The optimal f is monotonic.
Proof: Consider any partition of {s1, . . . , sn} into sets
S1, . . . , Sk. Let mi = maxs∈Si Si. Without loss of generality,
assume m1 ≤ m2 ≤ · · · ≤ mk. Now consider the monotonic
allocation of traces into sets S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
k where |S∗i | = |Si|.
Let m∗i = maxs∈S∗i s. Observe that m
∗
i ≤ mi for all i, i.e.
the new allocation has lower bandwidth.
Since the number of sets in the partition and the sizes of
those sets are unchanged, this new allocation has the same
uniform and non-uniform security as the original, but lower
bandwidth. Hence the optimal f must be monotonic.
We can compute the optimal partition for a given security
parameter using a dynamic program. If S1, . . . , Sk is is an
optimal uniformly -secure partition, then so is S1, . . . , Sk−1.
Thus the cost, C(, n) of the optimal uniformly -secure
partition satisfies the recurrence relation:
C(, n) =
{ ∞ if n < 1/
min
1≤j≤n−1/
C(, j) + (n− j)sn otherwise.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to compute a lower bound on the
bandwidth of any offline non-uniformly  secure fingerprinting
defense against AS attackers.
function AS -MIN-COST(n, , {s1, . . . , sn})
Array C[0 . . . n, 0 . . . n]
for i = 0, . . . , n do
C[i, 0]← 0
end for
for i = 0, . . . , n do
C[0, i]←∞
end for
for i = 1→ n do
for j = 1→ n do
C[j, i] = min1≤`≤i−1 [(i− `)si + C[j − 1, `]]
end for
end for
return C[n, n]
end function
Non-uniformly -secure partitions satisfy a slightly different
recurrence. If S1, . . . , Sk is is an optimal non-uniformly
k
n -secure partition, then S1, . . . , Sk−1 is an optimal non-
uniformly k−1n−|Sk| -secure partition. Therefore the optimal cost,
C ′( kn , n), satisfies the recurrence
C ′(
k
n
, n) =
 nsn if k = 1min
1≤j≤n−1
C ′(
k − 1
j
, j) + (n− j)sn o.w.
Algorithm 1 shows a dynamic program for computing a
lower bound on the bandwidth of any deterministic defense
that can achieve  non-uniform security in a closed-world
experiment on static websites with sizes s1, . . . , sn. We use
this algorithm to compute the lower bounds reported in Sec-
tion VII.
C. Security Against DLSVM Attackers
We now analyze the task of defending against DLSVM-
style attackers in the same theoretical setting as above. We
will show that finding the lowest-cost offline defense against
a DLSVM attacker is NP-hard, via a reduction from the binary
shortest common super-sequence problem. This reduction will
also show that the minimum bandwidth required by an offline
defense against a DLSVM attacker is at most twice the
bandwidth lower bound computed in the previous section.
This result, along with the experimental results in Section VII,
will show that offline defenses can achieve low cost and high
security, suggesting a promising avenue for future work.
Suppose websites w1, . . . , wn are all static and constructed
such that loading each site requires performing a fixed, serial-
ized sequence of requests and responses, e.g. each web page
contains a javascript program that loads objects one at a time
in a fixed order. Let di[j] = 1 iff the jth byte that must be
transmitted to load page wi is a transmission in the upstream
direction.
Loading website wi via a deterministic defense mechanism
produces a fixed trace ti. Let zi be the binary string defined
6by zi[j] = 1 iff the jth byte of ti is an upstream byte. Since,
for these websites, the defense mechanisms cannot delete or
re-order bytes, we must have that di is a sub-sequence of zi.
When the victim loads a web site, producing trace t, the
attacker can compute the corresponding string, z. In order for
the attacker to learn nothing about which web page the victim
loaded, we must have that, for all i, di is a substring of z.
Thus the defense system must compute some string, z, that
is simultaneously a super-sequence of d1, . . . , dn. Minimizing
the cost of such a defense is thus equivalent to finding the
shortest common super-sequence (SCS) of d1, . . . , dn. This
problem is NP-hard[7].
However, there is a simple 2-approximation for the binary
SCS problem. Let ` be the length of the longest string
d1, . . . , dn. Their SCS must be at least ` long, but is at most
2` long, since every binary string of length at most ` is a
sub-sequence of (01)`. Thus for any set of static websites
w1, . . . , wn, there exists a deterministic offline defense that
achieves (uniform or non-uniform) -security against DLSVM-
style attackers and incurs bandwidth cost that is at most twice
the bandwidth lower bound derived in the previous section.
V. CONGESTION-SENSITIVE BUFLO
Dyer, et al., described BuFLO, a hypothetical defense
scheme that hides all information about a website, except
possibly its size, and performed a simulation-based evaluation
that found that, although BuFLO is able to offer good security,
it incurs a high cost to do so.
In this section, we describe Congestion-Sensitive BuFLO
(CS-BuFLO), an extension to BuFLO that includes numerous
security and efficiency improvements. CS-BuFLO represents
a new approach to the design of fingerprinting defenses. Most
previously-proposed defenses were designed in response to
known attacks, and therefore took a black-listing approach to
information leaks, i.e. they tried to hide specific features, such
as packet sizes. In designing CS-BuFLO, we take a white-
listing approach – we start with a design that hides all traffic
features, and iteratively refine the design to reveal certain traf-
fic features that enable us to achieve significant performance
improvements without significantly harming security.
A. Review of BuFLO
The Buffered Fixed-Length Obfuscator (BuFLO) of Dyer,
et al., transmits a packet of size d bytes every ρ milliseconds,
and continues doing so for at least τ milliseconds. If b < d
bytes of application data are available when a packet is to
be sent, then the packet is padded with d − b extra bytes of
junk. The protocol assumes that the junk bytes are marked
so that the receiver can discard them. If the website does not
finish loading within τ milliseconds, then BuFLO continues
transmitting until the website finishes loading and then stops
immediately. Dyer, et al., did not specify how BuFLO detects
when the website has finished loading. They also did not
specify how BuFLO handles bidirectional communication –
presumably independent BuFLO instances are run at each end-
point.
BuFLO effectively hides everything about the website,
except possibly its size, but has several shortcomings:
• It either completely hides the size of the website or
completely reveals it (±d bytes). Thus it does not provide
the same level of security to all websites.
• BuFLO has large overheads for small websites. Thus its
overhead is also unevenly distributed.
• BuFLO is not TCP-friendly. In fact, it is the epitome of
a bad network citizen.
• BuFLO does not adapt when the user is visiting fast or
slow websites. It wastes bandwidth when loading slow
sites, and causes large latency when loading fast websites.
• BuFLO must be tuned to each user’s network connection.
If the BuFLO bandwidth, 1000dρ B/s, exceeds the user’s
connection speed, then BuFLO will incur additional delay
without improving security.
• Past research by Fu, et al., showed that transmitting at
fixed intervals can reveal load information at the sender,
which an attacker can use to infer partial information
about the data being transmitted[6].
Dyer, et al., proposed BuFLO as a straw-man defense system,
so it is understandable that they did not bother addressing
these problems. However, we show below that several of these
problems have common solutions, e.g. we can simultaneously
improve overhead and TCP-friendliness, simultaneously make
security and overhead more uniform, etc. Thus, as our evalu-
ation will show, CS-BuFLO may be a practical and efficient
defense for users requiring a high level of security.
Further, as noted by its authors, BuFLO’s simulation based
results “reflect an ideal implementation that assumes the
feasibility of implementing fixed packet timing intervals. This
is at the very least difficult and clearly impossible for certain
values of ρ. Simulation also ignores the complexities of cross-
layer communication in the network stack” [5]. As a result,
it remains unclear how well the defense performs in the real
world.
B. Overview of Congestion-Sensitive BuFLO
Algorithm 2 shows the main loop of the CS-BuFLO server.
The client loop is similar, except for the few differences
discussed throughout this section. Similar to BuFLO, CS-
BuFLO delivers fixed-size chunks of data at semi-regular
intervals. CS-BuFLO randomizes the timing of network writes
in order to counter the attack of Fu, et al.[6], but it maintains
a target average inter-packet time, ρ∗. CS-BuFLO periodically
updates ρ∗ to match its bandwidth to the rate of the sender
(Section V-C). Since updating ρ∗ based on the sender’s rate re-
veals information about the sender, CS-BuFLO performs these
updates infrequently. CS-BuFLO uses TCP to be congestion
friendly, and uses feedback from the TCP stack in order to
reduce the amount of junk data it needs to send (Section V-D).
Also like BuFLO, CS-BuFLO transmits extra junk data after
the website has finished loading in order to hide the total size
of the website. However, CS-BuFLO uses a scale-independent
padding scheme (Section V-E) and monitors the state of the
page loading process to avoid some unnecessary overheads
(Section V-F).
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Fig. 2. Rate adaptation in CS-BuFLO. ρ∗ is updated based on the packets transmitted to the other end between T2 and T15. Time intervals between two
consecutive packets are stored in an array Intervals[]. The two packets under consideration both contain some real payload data and they belong to the
same burst. i.e. Intervals = [T3 − T2, T5 − T3, T9 − T8, T12 − T11, T14 − T12, T15 − T14] and ρ∗ = 2blog2Median(Intervals[])c.
C. Rate Adaptation
CS-BuFLO adapts its transmission rate to match the rate
of the sender. This reduces wasted bandwidth when proxying
slow senders, and it reduces latency when proxying fast
senders. However, adapting CS-BuFLO’s transmission rate to
match the sender’s reveals information about the sender, and
therefore may harm security.
As shown in Figure 2, CS-BuFLO takes several steps to
limit the information that is leaked through rate adaptation.
First, it only adapts after transmitting 2k bytes, for some
integer k. Thus, during a session in which CS-BuFLO trans-
mits n bytes, CS-BuFLO will perform log2 n rate adjustments,
limiting the information leaked from these adjustments. This
choice also allows CS-BuFLO to adapt more quickly during
the beginning of a session, when the sender is likely to be
performing a TCP slow start. During this phase, CS-BuFLO
is able to ramp up its transmission rate just as quickly as the
sender can.
CS-BuFLO further limits information leakage by using a
robust statistic to update ρ∗. Between adjustments, it collects
estimates of the sender’s instantaneous bandwidth. It then
sets ρ∗ so as to match the sender’s median instantaneous
bandwidth. Median is a robust statistic, meaning that the new
ρ∗ value will not be strongly influenced by bandwidth bursts
and lulls, and hence ρ∗ will not reveal much about the sender’s
transmission pattern.
Note that the estimator only collects measurements during
uninterrupted bursts from the sender. This ensures that the
bandwidth measurements do not include delays caused by
dependencies between requests and responses.
For example, if the estimator sees a packet p1 from the
website, then a packet p2 from the client, and then another
packet p3 from the website, it may be the case that p3 is
a response to p2. In this case, the time between p1 and
p3 is constrained by the round trip time, not the website’s
bandwidth.
Finally, CS-BuFLO rounds all ρ∗ values up to a power of
two. This further hides information about the sender’s true
rate, and gives the sender room to increase it’s transmission
rate, e.g. during slow start.
D. Congestion-Sensitivity
There’s a trivial way to make BuFLO congestion sensitive
and TCP friendly: run the protocol over TCP. With this
approach, we grab an additional opportunity for increasing
efficiency: when the network is congested, CS-BuFLO does
not need to insert junk data to fill the output buffer.
Algorithm 4 shows our method for taking advantage of
congestion to reduce the amount of junk data sent by CS-
BuFLO. Note first that CS-SEND always writes exactly d bytes
to the TCP socket. Since the amount of data presented to
the TCP socket is always the same, this algorithm reveals
no information about the timing or size of application-data
packets from the website that have arrived at the CS-BuFLO
proxy.
This algorithm takes advantage of congestion to reduce the
amount of junk data it sends. To see why, imagine the TCP
connection to the client stalls for an extended period of time.
Eventually, the kernel’s TCP send queue for socket s will fill
up, and the call to write will return 0. From then until the
TCP congestion clears up, CS-BuFLO calls to CS-SEND will
not append any further junk data to B.
E. Stream Padding
CS-BuFLO hides the total size of real data transmitted by
continuing to transmit extra junk data after the browser and
web server have stopped transmitting.
Table II shows two related padding schemes we experi-
mented with in CS-BuFLO. Both schemes introduce at most
a constant factor of additional cost, but reveal at most a
logarithmic amount of information about the size of the
website. The first scheme, which we call payload padding,
continues transmitting until the total amount of transmitted
8Algorithm 2 The main loop of the Congestion-Sensitive
BuFLO server.
function CSBUFLO-SERVER(s)
while true do
(m, ρ) = READ-MESSAGE(ρ)
if m is application data from website then
output-buff ← output-buff ‖ data
real-bytes ← real-bytes + LENGTH(m)
last-site-response-time ← CURRENT-TIME
else if m is application data from client then
send m to the website
ρ-stats ← ρ-stats ‖ ⊥
onLoadEvent ← 0, padding-done ← 0
else if m is onLoad message then
onLoadEvent ← 1
else if m is padding-done message then
padding-done ← 1
else if m is a time-out then
if output-buff is not empty then
ρ-stats ← ρ-stats ‖ CURRENT-TIME
end if
(output-buff, j) ← CS-SEND(s, output-buff )
junk-bytes ← junk-bytes + j
end if
if DONE-XMITTING then
reset all variables
else . ρ∗ : Average time between sends to client
if ρ∗ =∞ then
ρ∗ ← INITIAL-RHO
else if CROSSED-THRESHOLD(real-bytes, junk-
bytes) then
ρ∗ ← RHO-ESTIMATOR(ρ-stats,ρ∗)
ρ-stats ← ∅
end if
if m is a time-out then
ρ← random number in [0, 2ρ∗]
end if
end if
end while
end function
data (R + J) is a multiple of 2dlog2 Re. This padding scheme
will transmit at most 2dlog2 Re additional bytes, so it increases
the cost by at most a factor of 2, but it reveals only log2R.
The second scheme, which we call total padding, continues
transmitting until R + J is a power of 2. This also increases
the cost by at most a factor of 2 and reveals, in the worst case,
log2R, but it will in practice hide more information about R
than payload padding.
Note that the CS-BuFLO server and the CS-BuFLO client
do not have to use the same stream padding scheme. Thus,
there are four possible padding configurations, which we
denote CPSP (client payload, server payload), CPST (client
payload, server total), CTSP (client total, server payload) and
CTST (client total, server total).
In order to determine when to stop padding, the CS-BuFLO
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for estimating new value of ρ∗ based
on past network performance.
function RHO-ESTIMATOR(ρ-stats, ρ∗)
I ← [ρ-statsi+1 − ρ-statsi | ρ-statsi 6=⊥ ∧ρ-statsi+1 6=⊥]
if I is empty list then
return ρ∗
else
return 2blog2 MEDIAN(I)c
end if
end function
Algorithm 4 Algorithm for sending data and using feedback
from TCP. Socket s should be configured with O_NONBLOCK.
function CS-SEND(s, output-buff )
n←LENGTH(output-buff )
j ← 0
if n < PACKET-SIZE then
j ← PACKET-SIZE − n
output-buff ← output-buff ‖ j
end if
r ← write(s, output-buff, PACKET-SIZE)
if r ≥ n then . Optional: reclaim unsent junk
output-buff← empty buffer
j ← r − n
else
remove last j bytes from output-buff
remove first r bytes from output-buff
j ← 0
end if
return (output-buff, j)
end function
server must know when the website has finished transmit-
ting. Congestion-Sensitive BuFLO uses two mechanisms to
recognize that the page has finished loading. First, the CS-
BuFLO client proxy monitors for the browser’s onLoad event.
The CS-BuFLO client notifies the CS-BuFLO server when it
receives the onLoad event from the browser. Once the CS-
BuFLO server receives the onLoad message from the client, it
considers the web server to be idle (see Algorithm 5) and will
stop transmitting as soon as it adds sufficient stream padding
and empties its transmit buffer. As a backup mechanism,
the CS-BuFLO server considers the website idle if QUIET-
TIME seconds pass without receiving new data from the
website. We used a QUIET-TIME of 2 seconds in our prototype
implementation.
F. Early Termination
As described above, the CS-BuFLO server is likely to finish
each page load by sending a relatively long tail of pure junk
packets. This tail can be a significant source of overhead
and, somewhat surprisingly, may not provide much additional
security.
Our initial investigations revealed that the long tail served
two purposes which could also be served through other, more
efficient means. As mentioned above, the long tail helps hide
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Schemes
Payload Sent
Before Padding
Junk Sent
Before Padding
Total Bytes Sent
After Padding
payload
padding
R J c2dlog2 Re
total
padding
R J 2dlog2(R+J)e
TABLE II
TWO DIFFERENT PADDING SCHEMES FOR CS-BUFLO.
Algorithm 5 Definition of the DONE-XMITTING function.
function DONE-XMITTING
return LENGTH(output-buff) ← 0
∧CHANNEL-IDLE(onLoadEvent,last-site-response-time)∧
(padding-done ∨ CROSSED-THRESHOLD(real-bytes + junk-bytes))
end function
function CHANNEL-IDLE(onLoadEvent,
last-site-response-time)
return onLoadEvent ∨ (last-site-response-time +
QUIET-TIME < CURRENT-TIME)
end function
function CROSSED-THRESHOLD(x)
return blog2(x− PACKET-SIZE)c < blog2 xc
end function
the total size of the website. However, the interior padding
performed by CS-SEND also obscures the total size of the
website. Our evaluation in Section VII investigates the security
impact of additional stream padding.
In the specific context of web browsing, the long tail also
hides the size of the last object sent from the web server to the
client. The attacker can infer some information about the size
of this object by measuring the amount of data the CS-BuFLO
server sends to the CS-BuFLO client after the CS-BuFLO
client stops transmitting to the CS-BuFLO server. However,
this information can also be hidden by having the CS-BuFLO
client continue to send junk packets to the CS-BuFLO server,
i.e. more aggressive stream padding from the CS-BuFLO client
may obviate the need for aggressive padding at the CS-BuFLO
server.
Based on these ideas, we implemented an early termination
feature in our CS-BuFLO prototype. The CS-BuFLO client
notifies the CS-BuFLO server that it is done padding. After
receiving this message, the CS-BuFLO server will stop trans-
mitting as soon as the web server becomes idle and its buffers
are empty.
Figure 3 illustrates how the padding scheme used by the
client and server can interact, including the impact of early
termination. Additional client padding can hide the size of the
last HTTP object, and early termination can avoid unnecessary
padding. Our evaluation investigates the security/efficiency
trade-offs between different padding regimes at the client and
server, and how they interact with early termination.
done
done
CPSP without
early termination
Client done
Server doneServer padding
CPSP with
early termination
CTSP with
early termination
CTSP without
early termination Server padding
Client done
Client done
Client done
Server done
Server done
Server done
Time
Client transmitting
Client transmitting
Client transmitting
Client transmitting
Server transmitting
Server transmitting
Server transmitting
Server transmitting
Fig. 3. The interaction between client and server padding schemes and early
termination. More padding at the client can help hide the size of the last object
sent from the server to the client. Early termination can avoid unnecessary
padding at the end of a page load.
G. Packet Sizes
Sending fixed-length packets hides packet size information
from the attacker. Although any fixed length should work,
it is important to choose a packet length that maximizes
performance. Since we may transmit pure junk packets during
the transmission, larger packets tend to cause higher bandwidth
overhead, and on the other hand, smaller packets may not make
full use of the link between the client and server, thus increase
the loading time.
Preliminary investigations revealed that over 95.7% of all
upstream packet transmissions are under 600 bytes, therefore,
this was used as the standard packet size in our experiments.
VI. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
We modified OpenSSH5.9p1 to implement Algorithm 2.
However, the optional junk recovery algorithm described in
Algorithm 4 was not implemented.
The SSH client was also modified to accept a new SOCKS
proxy command code, onLoadCmd. This command was used
to communicate to the server when to stop padding (as
described in Section V-E). A Firefox plugin, OnloadNotify,
that, upon detecting the page onLoad event, connects to the
SSH client’s SOCKS port and issues the onLoadCmd, was also
developed.
In addition, the following OpenSSH message types were
used:
1) The OpenSSH message type SSH_MSG_IGNORE,
which means all payload in a packet of this type can be
ignored, was used to insert junk data whenever needed.
2) The SSH_MSG_NOTIFY_ONLOAD message was cre-
ated to be used by the client to communicate reception
of onLoadCmd from the browser, to the server. Upon
receiving this message from the client, the CS-BuFLO
server stops transmitting as soon as it empties its buffer
and adds sufficient stream padding.
3) The SSH_MSG_NOTIFY_PADDINGDONE message
was created to implement the early termination feature
of CS-BuFLO. Upon receiving this message from the
client, the CS-BuFLO server stops transmitting as soon
as the web server becomes idle and its buffers are
empty.
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All the above messages were buffered and transmitted just
like other messages in Algorithm 2, i.e. using CS-SEND,
therefore an attacker is unable distinguish these messages from
other traffic.
VII. EVALUATION
We investigated several questions during our evaluation:
• How do the different stream padding schemes affect
performance and security of CS-BuFLO? What is the
effect of adding early termination to the protocol?
• How does CS-BuFLO’s security and overhead compare
to Tor’s, and how do they both compare to the theoretical
minimums derived in Section IV?
• Can we use the theoretical lower bounds to enable us to
compare defenses that have different security/overhead
trade-offs?
A. Experimental Setup
For our main experiments, we collected traffic from the
Alexa top 200 functioning, non-redirecting web pages using
four different defenses: plain SSH, Tor, CS-BuFLO with the
CTSP padding and early termination, and CS-BuFLO with
CPSP padding and early termination. We also collected several
smaller data sets using other configurations of CS-BuFLO,
but these are only used in the padding scheme evaluations
(Table III).
We constructed a list of the Alexa top 200 functioning, non-
redirecting, unique pages, as follows. We removed web pages
that failed to load in Firefox (without Tor or any other proxy).
We replaced URLs that redirected the browser to another
URL with their redirect target. Some websites display different
languages and contents depending on where the page is loaded,
e.g. www.google.com and www.google.de. We kept only one
URL for this type of website, i.e. we only had www.google.com
in our set. Our data set consisted of Alexa’s 200 highest-ranked
pages that met these criteria.
We collected 20 traces of each URL, clearing the browser
cache between each page load. We collected traces from each
web page in a round-robin fashion. As a result, each load of
the same URL occurred about 5 hours apart.
Measuring the precise latency of a fingerprinting defense
scheme poses a challenge: we can easily measure the time it
takes to load a page using the defense, but we cannot infer
the exact time it would have taken to load the page without
the defense. Therefore, every time we loaded a page using
a defense, we immediately loaded it again using SSH to get
an estimate of the time it would have taken to load the page
without the defense in place. We then compute latency ratios
the same way we compute bandwidth ratios, i.e. if L(t) is the
total duration of a packet trace, the latency ratio of a defense
scheme is
E
[
L(TDW )
]
E [L(TW )]
We collected network traffic using several different comput-
ers with slightly different versions of Ubuntu Linux – ranging
from 9.10 to 11.10. We used Firefox 3.6.23-3.6.24 and Tor
0.2.1.30 with polipo HTTP Proxy. All Firefox plugins were
Padding Early
Termination
Bandwidth
Ratio
Latency
Ratio
VNG++
Accuracy
CTSP Yes 3.59 3.91 29.0%
CTSP No 3.73 3.51 29.6%
CPSP Yes 2.60 2.87 34.2%
CPSP No 3.42 3.52 36.0%
TABLE III
SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE OF CONGESTION-SENSITIVE BUFLO
VARIANTS. VNG++ SUCCESS RATE IS THE PROBABILITY THAT THE
ATTACK WAS ABLE TO CORRECTLY GUESS WHICH OF 50 WEB PAGES THE
USER WAS VISITING.
disabled during data collection, except when collecting CS-
BuFLO traffic, where we enabled the OnloadNotify plugin.
Three of the computers had 2.8GHz Intel Pentium CPUs and
2GB of RAM, one computer had a 2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Duo
CPU with 2GB of RAM. We scripted Firefox using Ruby and
captured packets using tshark, the command-line version of
wireshark. For the SSH experiments, we used OpenSSH5.3p1.
Our Tor clients used the default configuration. SSH tunnels
passed between two machines on the same local network.
We measured the security of each defense by using the three
best traffic analysis attacks in the literature: VNG++ [5], the
Panchenko SVM [14], and DLSVM [3]. We ran each of the
above classifiers against the traces generated by each defense
using stratified 10-fold cross validation.
B. Results
Padding Schemes: Table III shows the bandwidth ratio,
latency ratio, and security (estimated using the VNG++ attack)
of four different versions of CS-BuFLO on a data set of 50
websites. Note that early termination does not appear to affect
security, although it can significantly reduce overhead in some
configurations. All other experiments in this paper use early
termination. The client padding scheme, on the other hand,
appears to control a trade-off between security and overhead.
Therefore we report the rest of our results for both CPSP and
CTSP padding.
Security Comparison: Figure 4 shows the level of secu-
rity various defense schemes provide against three different
attacks, as the number of web pages the attacker needs
to distinguish increases. Note that the CS-BuFLO schemes
have significantly better security than Tor and SSH. For each
defense scheme, we compute its average bandwidth ratio, BO,
and plot the lower bound on security that can be achieved
within that ratio, using the algorithm from Section IV.
Bandwidth Cost: Figure 5 plots the bandwidth ratios of
SSH, Tor, and CS-BuFLO with CTSP and CPSP padding. SSH
has almost no overhead, and Tor’s overhead is about 25% on
average. CS-BuFLO with CPSP has an average overhead of
129%, CTSP has average overhead 180%. Thus CS-BuFLO’s
improved security does come at a price.
Theoretical Bounds: Figure 6 evaluates CS-BuFLO, Tor,
SSH, and BuFLO against the theoretical lower bounds devel-
oped in Section IV.
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Fig. 4. Security of CS-BuFLO, Tor, and SSH compared to the lower bounds from Section IV, as a function of the number of possible web pages.
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Figure 6(a) shows the results of our empirical evaluation
of CS-BuFLO, Tor, and SSH on n = 120 sites and using the
DLSVM attack to estimate security. We limit to 120 sites to
make it easier to compare with the BuFLO results reported by
Dyer, et al., and which use 128 sites. There is a significant gap
between the bandwidth of CS-BuFLO and the lower bound.
However, as can be seen in Figure 6(c), CS-BuFLO in CTSP
mode is over 6× closer to the trade-off lower bound than Tor
for 200 sites, and is the most efficient scheme across all sizes
we measured.
Figure 6(b) presents the results of our empirical evaluation
of CS-BuFLO, Tor, and SSH on n = 120 websites, busing the
Panchenko attack to estimate security. We also present Dyer’s
reported results from their experiments with BuFLO on 128
sites, also using the Panchenko attack. Note that, since Dyer
used 128 sites to evaluate BuFLO, this slightly over-estimates
BuFLO’s security compared to the other schemes plotted in
the figure. Also, recall that Dyer’s experiments with BuFLO
were all based on simulation.
Despite the differences in experimental methodology, we
can see that CS-BuFLO offers performance in the same
general range as the BuFLO configurations from Dyer’s paper,
but has slightly worse security in our experiments.
Figure 6(d) shows that, based on our experiments and
the simulation results of Dyer, et al., all but one BuFLO
configuration get closer to the trade-off lower bound curve
than CS-BuFLO, Tor, and SSH (SSH is omitted from the
graph because its ratio to the lower bound was never less
than 400). This figure also highlights a difference between
the DLSVM and Panchenko attacks. In the DLSVM results
shown in Figure 6(c), Tor and SSH diverge from CS-BuFLO.
In the Panchenko results in Figure 6(d), Tor and CS-BuFLO
appear to be equally close to the lower bound.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Since early termination does not seem to affect security,
the padding results suggest that the padding performed while
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Fig. 6. Non-uniform lower bounds on bandwidth ratio, as a function of the security parameter, , and specific trade-off points of the systems evaluated.
The BuFLO results are taken from Dyer, et al. [5], and therefore use n = 128. SSH is omitted from Figure 6(d) because its ratio to the lower bound was
always greater than 400.
transmitting a website sufficiently hides the size of the website,
so that additional stream padding at the end of the transmission
has little security benefit. Additional client padding does
improve security, though – probably by obscuring the size of
the final object requested by the client.
The lower bounds derived in Section IV proved useful for
comparing schemes. For example, without the lower bounds, it
is difficult to determine whether Tor, SSH, or CS-BuFLO has
the greatest efficiency in Figure 6(a), but it becomes obvious
in Figure 6(c).
Overall, CS-BuFLO has better security than any other
defense in our experiments, albeit at greater expense. It has
the best security/overhead trade-off, as well.
CS-BuFLO’s security/overhead trade-off is in the same
range as the estimates Dyer obtained for BuFLO in their
simulations. For example, Dyer, et al., reported that, in one
configuration of BuFLO, bandwidth overhead was 200% and
the Panchenko SVM had an 24.1% success rate on 128
websites. We found that CS-BuFLO with CTSP padding had
an overhead of 180% on 120 websites, and that the Panchenko
SVM had a success rate of 23.4%.
CS-BuFLO’s congestion-sensitivity likely had little impact
in these experiments, which were carried out on a fast local
network, so that congestion was rare. However, CS-BuFLO’s
congestion-sensitivity means that, in a real deployment, it
would have even better bandwidth overhead.
CS-BuFLO’s latency overhead is approximately 3 in all
our experiments. This is better than Tor’s latency, although
Tor has the additional overhead of onion routing, so no fair
comparison is possible. We cannot compare with the latency
estimates reported by Dyer, et al., because they gave only
absolute latency values.
IX. CONCLUSION
Congestion-Sensitive BuFLO offers a high-security,
moderate-overhead solution to website fingerprinting
attacks. Compared to SSH and Tor, it achieves a better
security/bandwidth trade-off, i.e. it uses its bandwidth
efficiently to provide extra security. Our experiments also
show that it has acceptable latencies. The padding schemes
developed in this paper, along with browser-coordination and
early-termination algorithm, can improve security with less
overhead than previous stream padding schemes. Interestingly,
we also found that padding from one end of a connection can
sometimes be an efficient way to hide information about the
data sent from the other side of the connection.
Our theoretical results provide new tools for comparing
defense systems. More importantly, they suggest that a small
amount of well-placed cover traffic can make many websites
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look similar. Therefore, the reason website fingerprinting de-
fenses are so expensive is not because websites are so different.
Rather, it is because the defense, operating blindly, does not
know where to put the cover traffic, and so it must put it
everywhere. An interesting direction for future research is to
attempt to approximate the knowledge of an offline defense by
having a real defense remember information about websites
seen in the past.
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